As I wrote about in my previous post, a trial was under way to determine the guilt of 22 resisters who hijacked a train bearing coal for a power plant. The defendants argued that the operations of the power plant cause deaths by contributing to climate change and global warming. Thus, they argued that their acts of defiance were in defense of the environment and arguably in defense of human rights implicated by the imminent threat of environmental degradation due to global warming.
Today, the trial concluded with final testimony of the defendants and final statements to the jury. In their final arguments, the defendants admonished the jury: "to look beyond the confines of this court to the wider world, and to make a judgment based not just on law, but on justice." Justice Spencer, the judge presiding over the case, for his part instructed the jury to ignore issues of climate change offered by the defendants and focus strictly on the "facts of the case" - the acts of the defendants - and not their reasons.
Ultimately, the jury convicted the defendants of obstructing the coal train. Judge Spencer stated that although the defendants were guilty, he was not considering jail terms as part of the sentencing, but community service.
In what ways is resistance legitimized or inhibited by this legal ruling and by the trial? To be sure, a straight acquittal would have been the clearest example of law or the legal system legitimizing an unlawful act of resistance waged in defense of a poignant and weighty matter- as in the case of the "Kingsnorth Six" protesters who were charged with defacing the chimney of a power plant and acquitted by a jury. Yet although the jury convicted the defendants, Judge Spencer has also indicated that during sentencing, which is to take place in the coming months, none of the defendants would be punished with detention but community service. Thus, substantively, moving beyond the formality of the guilty verdict and the entering of the judgment, the sentence might appear rather light, given the costs of the clean up due to the defendants' shoveling of coal onto the train tracks. Does such a light sentence then nevertheless serve as a rather subtle encouragement of such resistance? After all, one of the main purposes of any criminal legal proceedings is to deter future criminal activities. The sentence of community service appears if nothing else to encourage these defendants if not others to engage in further or similar acts of resistance.
The conduct of the trial in some ways limits the types of (relevant if not material) evidence that can be mounted to provide proof of the ultimate lawfulness of such acts when waged in defense of the environment. While the judge formally limited the defendants' ability to argue a certain type of defense, he nevertheless permitted the defendants to offer evidence of motive (while simultaneously advising them to stop doing it or instructing the jury to essentially disregard the evidence). Yet, he disallowed any expert testimony on climate change to be admitted and moreover evidence of the failure of the British government to take effective steps to ameliorate conditions. Resisters, at least according to what transpired in this trial, may offer testimony about their own motives but they cannot buttress their arguments with objective expert testimony that would support their actions and potentially sustain them by a jury. These resisters were thus limited in the type of defense they could wage that included objective and material evidence.
This trial demonstrates some of the interesting tensions in play when resistance collides with the laws of the state and established rules of evidence. Courts and juries can clearly see the need for individual actors to sometimes break the law in order to advance a more pressing goal that government are not addressing. Yet, law is reluctant to allow resistance to run rampant (not surprisingly); like a fire, it needs to be controlled. Thus, resisters may gain the sympathy of those charged with applying the law yet they must be punished, however nominally through punishments like community service. Resistance is thus formally repudiated but subtly encouraged. While acknowledging the justness of certain resistance, law is afraid to give it too much power to fully speak in the sacrosanct geographic spaces where law is interpreted and applied. When Judge Spencer admonished defendants to simply explain the events, (just the facts) but not the motivational context, he attempted to enforce law's control in this space - law is interested in certain kinds of facts, but not others that might matter. Yet by asserting their motivations nevertheless and invoking a broader notion of justice than what the law presently formally acknowledges, the resisters resisted law's attempts to muzzle them and control their speech. Still, while unable to silence the voice of resistance, the court was capable of and asserted its power to shield the jury from being presented with expert evidence about the gravity of climate change and thus supporting the defendants' actions. In other words, law is disinterested in allowing a defendant-resister the opportunity to wage a full defense, even where judicial power may be inclined to sympathize with their activism by letting resisters off with a light and non-punitive sentence.
With the failure of governments to step in and take control of certain matters, resisters may need to step in to respond and engage in certain types of conduct to draw public attention to the problem. The interaction between law and resistance is thus a continuous and varied process with equally varied results.
Sources:
Martin Wainwright, "Jury Retires to Consider Verdict in Drax Hijack Trial" The Guardian, July 2, 2009. Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/02/drax-protester-trial-jury-retires
Martin Wainwright, "Drax Protesters Found Guilty of Obstructing Coal Train" The Guardian, July 3, 2009. Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/03/drax-coal-train-trial-guilty
Today, the trial concluded with final testimony of the defendants and final statements to the jury. In their final arguments, the defendants admonished the jury: "to look beyond the confines of this court to the wider world, and to make a judgment based not just on law, but on justice." Justice Spencer, the judge presiding over the case, for his part instructed the jury to ignore issues of climate change offered by the defendants and focus strictly on the "facts of the case" - the acts of the defendants - and not their reasons.
Ultimately, the jury convicted the defendants of obstructing the coal train. Judge Spencer stated that although the defendants were guilty, he was not considering jail terms as part of the sentencing, but community service.
In what ways is resistance legitimized or inhibited by this legal ruling and by the trial? To be sure, a straight acquittal would have been the clearest example of law or the legal system legitimizing an unlawful act of resistance waged in defense of a poignant and weighty matter- as in the case of the "Kingsnorth Six" protesters who were charged with defacing the chimney of a power plant and acquitted by a jury. Yet although the jury convicted the defendants, Judge Spencer has also indicated that during sentencing, which is to take place in the coming months, none of the defendants would be punished with detention but community service. Thus, substantively, moving beyond the formality of the guilty verdict and the entering of the judgment, the sentence might appear rather light, given the costs of the clean up due to the defendants' shoveling of coal onto the train tracks. Does such a light sentence then nevertheless serve as a rather subtle encouragement of such resistance? After all, one of the main purposes of any criminal legal proceedings is to deter future criminal activities. The sentence of community service appears if nothing else to encourage these defendants if not others to engage in further or similar acts of resistance.
The conduct of the trial in some ways limits the types of (relevant if not material) evidence that can be mounted to provide proof of the ultimate lawfulness of such acts when waged in defense of the environment. While the judge formally limited the defendants' ability to argue a certain type of defense, he nevertheless permitted the defendants to offer evidence of motive (while simultaneously advising them to stop doing it or instructing the jury to essentially disregard the evidence). Yet, he disallowed any expert testimony on climate change to be admitted and moreover evidence of the failure of the British government to take effective steps to ameliorate conditions. Resisters, at least according to what transpired in this trial, may offer testimony about their own motives but they cannot buttress their arguments with objective expert testimony that would support their actions and potentially sustain them by a jury. These resisters were thus limited in the type of defense they could wage that included objective and material evidence.
This trial demonstrates some of the interesting tensions in play when resistance collides with the laws of the state and established rules of evidence. Courts and juries can clearly see the need for individual actors to sometimes break the law in order to advance a more pressing goal that government are not addressing. Yet, law is reluctant to allow resistance to run rampant (not surprisingly); like a fire, it needs to be controlled. Thus, resisters may gain the sympathy of those charged with applying the law yet they must be punished, however nominally through punishments like community service. Resistance is thus formally repudiated but subtly encouraged. While acknowledging the justness of certain resistance, law is afraid to give it too much power to fully speak in the sacrosanct geographic spaces where law is interpreted and applied. When Judge Spencer admonished defendants to simply explain the events, (just the facts) but not the motivational context, he attempted to enforce law's control in this space - law is interested in certain kinds of facts, but not others that might matter. Yet by asserting their motivations nevertheless and invoking a broader notion of justice than what the law presently formally acknowledges, the resisters resisted law's attempts to muzzle them and control their speech. Still, while unable to silence the voice of resistance, the court was capable of and asserted its power to shield the jury from being presented with expert evidence about the gravity of climate change and thus supporting the defendants' actions. In other words, law is disinterested in allowing a defendant-resister the opportunity to wage a full defense, even where judicial power may be inclined to sympathize with their activism by letting resisters off with a light and non-punitive sentence.
With the failure of governments to step in and take control of certain matters, resisters may need to step in to respond and engage in certain types of conduct to draw public attention to the problem. The interaction between law and resistance is thus a continuous and varied process with equally varied results.
Sources:
Martin Wainwright, "Jury Retires to Consider Verdict in Drax Hijack Trial" The Guardian, July 2, 2009. Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/02/drax-protester-trial-jury-retires
Martin Wainwright, "Drax Protesters Found Guilty of Obstructing Coal Train" The Guardian, July 3, 2009. Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/03/drax-coal-train-trial-guilty
1 comment:
The case is very reminiscent of earlier anti-nuclear civil disobedience cases, and is indeed a good example of a decidedly mixed response from the courts. The traditional exclusion of mobile as relevant by the criminal law is the root of the problem, from a technical point of view. However, one can wonder whether in such cases the issue is truly one of "mobile" rather than, for example, a defense of necessity (in such a case the "mobile" is to avoid the imminent danger - but in that case it is not a mobile at all).
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