A interesting trial is currently transpiring in Leeds, England. The defendants are a group of 22 environmental activists, including university lecturers and film-makers. Their crime? They hijacked a coal train destined for a power station owned by Drax. The defendants shovelled coal on to the tracks - resulting in disrupted passenger and freight train service for two days. The clean up costs amounted to 30,000 pounds. One of the principal defendants, Dr. Paul Chatterton testified to the urgent and deadly threat posed by carbon emissions from Drax, the largest coal-fired power station in Europe. As part of his testimony, Dr. Chatterton argued that: "UN statistics show that the amount of carbon produced by Drax was responsible for 180 deaths a year. Every minute we were on that train, we were stopping carbon emissions."
According to the recent report by Martin Wainwright in The Guardian, the judge and defendants have been on a collision path. The defendants have sought to inject evidence of (deeply-held) motive, i.e. the peril to the planet posed by Drax's operations. The defendants are ultimately looking to have the jury engage in jury nullification, that is - nullify the application of the criminal statute to this particular act or set of acts. The judge on the other hand has consistently sought to veer defendants' testimony solely to their actions, rather than elucidating on their reasons behind their actions to may help sway the jury to acquit them. The judge is seeking to have the jury merely decide whether the train was hijacked and that the defendants intended to do so. Full stop.
Although the trial resumes, a couple of preliminary observations may be in order. First, Judge Spencer's attempts to limit the jury's ability to hear evidence of motive demonstrates the challenges that resister's face in challenging the application of the law to certain types of actions. This is of course nothing novel. In court-martial proceedings, prosecutions of conscientious objectors as military deserters often prohibit defendants from presenting evidence of motive, regardless of whether the military operations objected to violate international law. Yet the defendants' resistance does not seem to stop at merely dumping coal on train tracks and hijacking a train to make a point about global warming. By continually injecting their evidence of motive, notwithstanding the judge's attempts to leave it out, they challenge the way the legal system attempts to restrict relevant evidence and information which may impact upon their conviction and the dispensation of the trial.
My second observation is that while jury nullification is theoretically permitted in various legal systems, judges might be loathe to permit their courtrooms to be used as fora for expositing resistance philosophies that seemingly undermine the laws the courts are meant to apply. Yet the defendants in this case, while violating national norms (The Malicious Damage Act of 1861), were arguably acting in defence of other norms and frameworks, including human rights norms, including the right to life (threatened by the damage caused by Drax's carbon emissions).
As the trial continues, the jury's decision will be illuminating as to whether juries may be willing to legitimize certain acts of resisters when waged for important causes. If the jury acquits the defendants, they will have indeed legitimized the latter's acts of resistance (and in some ways will have participated in it themselves) in support of a seemingly compelling cause. Furthermore, they will have endorsed the defendants' strategy of inserting their evidence of motive.
According to the recent report by Martin Wainwright in The Guardian, the judge and defendants have been on a collision path. The defendants have sought to inject evidence of (deeply-held) motive, i.e. the peril to the planet posed by Drax's operations. The defendants are ultimately looking to have the jury engage in jury nullification, that is - nullify the application of the criminal statute to this particular act or set of acts. The judge on the other hand has consistently sought to veer defendants' testimony solely to their actions, rather than elucidating on their reasons behind their actions to may help sway the jury to acquit them. The judge is seeking to have the jury merely decide whether the train was hijacked and that the defendants intended to do so. Full stop.
Although the trial resumes, a couple of preliminary observations may be in order. First, Judge Spencer's attempts to limit the jury's ability to hear evidence of motive demonstrates the challenges that resister's face in challenging the application of the law to certain types of actions. This is of course nothing novel. In court-martial proceedings, prosecutions of conscientious objectors as military deserters often prohibit defendants from presenting evidence of motive, regardless of whether the military operations objected to violate international law. Yet the defendants' resistance does not seem to stop at merely dumping coal on train tracks and hijacking a train to make a point about global warming. By continually injecting their evidence of motive, notwithstanding the judge's attempts to leave it out, they challenge the way the legal system attempts to restrict relevant evidence and information which may impact upon their conviction and the dispensation of the trial.
My second observation is that while jury nullification is theoretically permitted in various legal systems, judges might be loathe to permit their courtrooms to be used as fora for expositing resistance philosophies that seemingly undermine the laws the courts are meant to apply. Yet the defendants in this case, while violating national norms (The Malicious Damage Act of 1861), were arguably acting in defence of other norms and frameworks, including human rights norms, including the right to life (threatened by the damage caused by Drax's carbon emissions).
As the trial continues, the jury's decision will be illuminating as to whether juries may be willing to legitimize certain acts of resisters when waged for important causes. If the jury acquits the defendants, they will have indeed legitimized the latter's acts of resistance (and in some ways will have participated in it themselves) in support of a seemingly compelling cause. Furthermore, they will have endorsed the defendants' strategy of inserting their evidence of motive.
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