As protesters in Middle Eastern and North African states continue to confront government regimes in an effort to change the nature of the polities that they live under, government soldiers are often expected to counter the protest movements using violence. One way to motivate soldiers is to frame the endeavor as a move toward fighting (not surprisingly) "terrorism" and insurgency. When confronting such "terrorism" soldiers however may encounter a different narrative than that which they have been fed by their superiors.
In a recent article in The Guardian, Martin Chulov narrates the story of Wasid, a Syrian conscript who was ordered to fire on civilian protesters. For many soldiers, such orders are antithetical to their duties as combatants. As Wasid posits, "We are soldiers and soldiers do not shoot at civilians." However, speaking out can come at a heavy price. One soldier, Wasid recounts to Chulov, informed a superior officer of his feelings respecting the government's conduct toward civilians. The soldier was killed the next day; purportedly shot by such (non-existent) terrorists.
Wasid and numerous others deserted and fled to various foreign jurisdictions. Wasid managed to escape to Turkey and is being assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Avaaz. He is providing information that will be included in a referral the International Criminal Court.
The Guardian article closes with an account of Wasid's anger not at the government but at fellow soldiers who stayed back knowing about the deaths of civilians. Inferred from this is his belief in the duty of the soldiers to disobey and desert rather than participate in the government's crimes.
Wasid's and his colleague's resistance demonstrates a number of important things. First, soldiers are not mere automatons that simply abide by the orders and directives of their superiors. Soldiers have the capability of thought and action. Soldiers are or can serve as vital agents against unlawful military conduct that they are expected to carry out or otherwise support. This may manifest itself by attacking fellow soldiers who refuse to resist and carry out the illegal orders to attack noncombatants (although this may very well be suicidal). It may emerge, like Wasid, through an act of desertion where the deserter refuses to associate much less assist in the illegality. When soldiers desert en masse or in substantial numbers, such actions can deprive the government of legitimacy and furthermore spur other resistance within the military. Also, by speaking out against the government's orders, deserting soldiers draw attention to events that the government would prefer not to have illuminated by the international community.
Second, and closely tied to the first point, soldiers are also legal actors in the sense of perceiving the illegality of their orders and exercising a conscious decision as to how to govern themselves accordingly. Wasid's legal vision and interpretation stems from a normative belief that soldiers do not shoot civilians. Thus, as Rod Macdonald has asserted, an individual's actions may not necessarily be just an illustration of civil disobedience (or a failure of law enforcement), but a genuine reflection of the resister's vision of legal normativity. In Wasid's case it was both an act of resistance as well as a reflection of his view of legal normativity.
Third, such defectors require assistance from the international community or other entity. Clearly, were Wasid and his fellow deserters to have fired on civilians, they would have committed serious crimes - the participation in which might very well have excluded them from gaining protection under international refugee law were they to have deserted only after committed the killings (see Article 1F of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). If we expect such individuals to refuse participation in illegal conduct, the international community must consider steps towards assisting individuals who refuse to participate or even associate in military actions that involve conduct that falls below the basic rules of human conduct (see UNCHR Handbook, para.171). This may serve as a model for other soldiers and may assure them that they will be protected for having exercised a legitimate "political opinion".
Sources:
Martin Chulov, "Syrian Army Defector Says He Was Told To Shoot Unarmed Protesters" The Guardian (27 June 2011), online: The Guardian Unlimited.
Amar Khoday, "Protecting Those Who Go Beyond the Law: Contemplating Refugee Status for Individuals Who Challenge Oppression Through Resistance" (2011) 25 Geo. Imm. L.J. 571.
Roderick A. Macdonald, "Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism" (1998) 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 69.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1992).
In a recent article in The Guardian, Martin Chulov narrates the story of Wasid, a Syrian conscript who was ordered to fire on civilian protesters. For many soldiers, such orders are antithetical to their duties as combatants. As Wasid posits, "We are soldiers and soldiers do not shoot at civilians." However, speaking out can come at a heavy price. One soldier, Wasid recounts to Chulov, informed a superior officer of his feelings respecting the government's conduct toward civilians. The soldier was killed the next day; purportedly shot by such (non-existent) terrorists.
Wasid and numerous others deserted and fled to various foreign jurisdictions. Wasid managed to escape to Turkey and is being assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Avaaz. He is providing information that will be included in a referral the International Criminal Court.
The Guardian article closes with an account of Wasid's anger not at the government but at fellow soldiers who stayed back knowing about the deaths of civilians. Inferred from this is his belief in the duty of the soldiers to disobey and desert rather than participate in the government's crimes.
Wasid's and his colleague's resistance demonstrates a number of important things. First, soldiers are not mere automatons that simply abide by the orders and directives of their superiors. Soldiers have the capability of thought and action. Soldiers are or can serve as vital agents against unlawful military conduct that they are expected to carry out or otherwise support. This may manifest itself by attacking fellow soldiers who refuse to resist and carry out the illegal orders to attack noncombatants (although this may very well be suicidal). It may emerge, like Wasid, through an act of desertion where the deserter refuses to associate much less assist in the illegality. When soldiers desert en masse or in substantial numbers, such actions can deprive the government of legitimacy and furthermore spur other resistance within the military. Also, by speaking out against the government's orders, deserting soldiers draw attention to events that the government would prefer not to have illuminated by the international community.
Second, and closely tied to the first point, soldiers are also legal actors in the sense of perceiving the illegality of their orders and exercising a conscious decision as to how to govern themselves accordingly. Wasid's legal vision and interpretation stems from a normative belief that soldiers do not shoot civilians. Thus, as Rod Macdonald has asserted, an individual's actions may not necessarily be just an illustration of civil disobedience (or a failure of law enforcement), but a genuine reflection of the resister's vision of legal normativity. In Wasid's case it was both an act of resistance as well as a reflection of his view of legal normativity.
Third, such defectors require assistance from the international community or other entity. Clearly, were Wasid and his fellow deserters to have fired on civilians, they would have committed serious crimes - the participation in which might very well have excluded them from gaining protection under international refugee law were they to have deserted only after committed the killings (see Article 1F of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). If we expect such individuals to refuse participation in illegal conduct, the international community must consider steps towards assisting individuals who refuse to participate or even associate in military actions that involve conduct that falls below the basic rules of human conduct (see UNCHR Handbook, para.171). This may serve as a model for other soldiers and may assure them that they will be protected for having exercised a legitimate "political opinion".
Sources:
Martin Chulov, "Syrian Army Defector Says He Was Told To Shoot Unarmed Protesters" The Guardian (27 June 2011), online: The Guardian Unlimited
Amar Khoday, "Protecting Those Who Go Beyond the Law: Contemplating Refugee Status for Individuals Who Challenge Oppression Through Resistance" (2011) 25 Geo. Imm. L.J. 571.
Roderick A. Macdonald, "Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism" (1998) 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 69.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1992).
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